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Abstract
A model of the Italian 380 kV electrical transmission network has
been analyzed under the topological and the functional viewpoints.
The DC power flow model used to evaluate the power flux has been
solved on the basis of input conditions (injected power - extracted
power, line’s reactances and the maximum flux capacity of each line)
taken from real data. The vulnerability of the network under load con-
ditions has been estimated by evaluating the power flux redistribution
along the lines subsequent to line’s removal. When the perturbed
network cannot sustain a given input–output demand, the maximum
power sustainable by the network has been evaluated to optimize the
Quality of Service, defined as the difference between the expected
and the effective dispatched power. The functional relevance of the dif-
ferent lines of the network has been classified according to the amount
of power that the network must reduce, to keep alive, upon their re-
moval. Results show that topological and functional relevances are
related to different lines; lines having a strong topological relevance
may have a bare relevance in the flow distribution and thus their re-
moval does not affect the functioning of the network.
PACS: 84.70.+p, 89.75.Fb, 02.70.-c
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1 Introduction
The high-voltage electrical transmission network is at the top of a hierarchical
view of electrical Critical Infrastructures (CI); its incorrect functioning has
a strong repercussion on both the electrical transmission and distribution
processes. Its functioning, moreover, strongly influences that of many other
CIs which are mutually interdependent(see, in this respect, [1] and the
assessment of the effects of the blackout experienced by Italy on September
2003 1).
In the present work, we study the properties of the italian high-voltage
(380 kV) electrical transmission network (HVIET hereafter), to estimate the
vulnerability of the network on the basis of the analysis of its topological
properties and of the results of a model of power transport. We have also
attempted to establish some correlation between the topological properties
of the different parts of the network and their functional relevance.
Several works (see, among others, [2, 3, 4]) have pointed out the existence
of some relation between topology and vulnerability. Topological analysis
might be used to predict points of structural vulnerability (i.e. indicating
the links whose failure induce a severe structural damage like, e. g., the
disconnection of some node or the increase of the network’s diameter or the
average internode’s distance). In the present work, we wish to investigate
the vulnerability issue also from the viewpoint of the network’s functioning.
The electrical power flow establishes along the different lines, depending on
topology, on the position in the networks of sources and loads, on the line’s
characteristics etc. It could happen that lines having topological relevance
have, in turn, a bare relevance on the flow distribution. It is therefore im-
portant to associate to a vulnerability study based on the simple topological
analysis of its components, the analysis of the impact that faults (i.e. arcs
and/or node’s removal) have on the network’s functionality.
1Interim Report of the Investigation Committee on the 28th September 2003 blackout
in Italy (http://www.ucte.org/publications/library). UCTE is the ”Union for the Co-
ordination of Transmission of Electricity” ; it represents the association of transmission
system operators in continental Europe, providing a reliable market base by efficient and
secure electric ”power highways”.
2
2 Model and computational method
We have analyzed data relative to the Italian high-voltage (380 kV) electrical
transmission network (HVIET). This study follows previous works performed
to unveil, from topological analysis, a number of features of the HVIET
[3, 4]. The present work, however, aims at introducing a vulnerability analysis
based on a dynamical model of the network, by reproducing the power flow
conditions and by evaluating the impact on these conditions produced by the
introduction of faults in the form of line’s removal.
New network’s data have been inferred from the analysis of the public
documentation. They slightly differ from those recently reported in a previ-
ous work [4] as they account for the opening of new tracts of the network.
HVIET can be represented by an undirected graph of N nodes and E lines
(N = 310 and E = 361). Data allow to qualify each node as source S
(where part of the power is inserted in the network), load L (where part of
the power is extracted from the network) or junction J (which is neither
a S nor a L node). There are S = 97 source nodes, L = 113 load nodes
and J = 100 junction nodes. The topology of the HVIET is reported in
Fig.1. Some lines (14 out of 361) are constituted by double lines which are
not displayed in the graph of fig.1. Points of cut of the network (which is
connected with other european networks) have been substituted with ”ficti-
tious” source nodes where the same amount of electrical power received by
foreigner countries is pumped into the network.
Several topological properties have been analysed: first of all, the distribu-
tion P (k) of the node’s degree k which allows to ”classify” its topology. The
network has a limited number of hubs, whose maximum degree is kmax = 11.
P (k) and the cumulative degree distribution P (k > K) are both likely to be
fit to an exponential (single–scale network [2, 3, 8]). The latter distribution
can be fitted to P (k > K) ∼ e−0.55K in agreement with previous findings
for the North-american power grid [2]. A further property measured on the
HVIET network is the average clustering coefficient C [3] which results to
be as small as C = 2.06 · 10−2.
We have also evaluated other relevant topological properties of nodes and
lines: the betweenneess and the information centralities.
Betwenneess centrality is defined for nodes and lines, bi and bij respec-
tively, as in [3], by measuring the ”relevance” of a node (link) for the con-
nection of all other nodes.
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bi =
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)
∑
j,k 6=i
njk(i)
njk
(1)
bij =
1
Np
∑
k,l
nkl(ij)
nkl
(2)
where njk(i) is the number of shortest paths connecting nodes j and k
which pass through node i; nkl(ij) is the number of shortest paths connecting
nodes k and l which make use of the link between nodes i and j (if any) and
Np the total number of paths on which the sum is evaluated.
A further measured quantity has been the information centrality of the
nodes (introduced by [7]), which relates the importance of a node to the
ability of the network to respond to its removal. If one defines the efficiency
E[G] of a graph as
E[G] =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i,j∈G
1
dij
(3)
where dij is the shortest–path distance between nodes i and j, then the
information centrality Ii of node i is
Ii =
∆E
E
=
E[G]−E[G′]
E[G]
(4)
where E[G] and E[G′] are the efficiency of the unperturbed network and
that of the network after the removal of node i, respectively. Analoguosly
to the betwennees, also the information centrality can be defined for lines,
giving origin to the quantity Iij.
Table 1 provides the ranking of the nodes with respect to the values of
the degree k, the betweenness centrality bi and the information centrality
Ii, while Table 2 gives the ranks of the lines with respect to bij and Iij.
Each graph can be represented by an Adjacency matrixA whose elements
Aij = 1 if nodes i and j are connected (there is a link in between). A further
insight on the network’s topology can be obtained by performing the spectral
analysis of its Laplacian matrix L defined as
Lij =
{ ∑N
k=1Aik if i = j
−Aij if i 6= j
(5)
The analysis of the sign of the components of the eigenvector associated to the
first non–vanishing eigenvalue of the Laplacian allows to optimally bisecate
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the network. As L is symmetric, the first eigenvalue is always vanishing.
The n components of the eigenvector vL2 = (v1, v2, ..., vn) associated to the
second eigenvalue solve the one–dimensional quadratic placement problem of
minimizing the function
z =
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(vi − vj)
2Aij (6)
The vector is subject to the constraint |v| = (vTv)
1
2 = 1 [9]. The process
allows to partition the graph G = (N,E) into two disjoint subsets U and
W such that LUW/(NU · NW ) is minimized. LUW is the number of links to
be removed and NU , NW are the number of nodes in the two resulting sub-
networks. It comes clear that this procedure allows the ”optimal” bisection
of the graph, i.e. it forms the closest possible subnetworks U and V with
the minimum amount of broken links LUW [10, 11]. This allows to define a
critical section, an ideal cut line which bisecates the network into the two
largest connected subnetworks with the minimum number of broken links.
By applying of the min–cut method to HVIET [4] the network is diveded
into two, connected, parts HVIETU and HVIETW , the first formed by a
number of nodes N(HVIETU )=115, the second by N(HVIETW )=195. The
two parts are separated by only six links (see fig.1). The ideal line, joining
the location of the removed links, could be called first critical section.
Table 3 reports the links involved in the first critical section of the network.
This is a major outcome of the spectral analysys providing a way to locate the
critical vulnerability lines of the network. This procedure could be, in fact,
iterated on the resulting components of the graphs, by creating critical
sections of higher orders. The definition of critical sections of higher order
could be a valuable solution for the problem of islanding, a procedure often
used to isolate regions of the network to avoid cascade effects [12].
There are a few nodes with critical topological properties: nodes 158,
183, 153, 168 and 154 have highest values of bi and Ii. These nodes are also
important as starting/ending points of lines of topological relevance (high bij
and Iij). A few of these nodes ( 153, 183 and 154) are also involved in the
first critical section. All these nodes could be thus ascribed to a set of node
whose failure produces a severe ”topological” damage.
We will now investigate if the electrical flow makes use of these nodes or
if the interplay between topological and electrical properties of the different
lines modifies this scenario.
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3 The DC power flow model
We now introduce a flow model for the electrical power which will allow to
analyse the ”dynamical vulnerability” of the network.
We will use a simplified transport model as we wish to evaluate the ef-
fect of the network topology on the steady–state power flow rather than on
transitory regimes. We will firstly evaluate the power flow distribution in the
unperturbed network, resulting from a specific ”power input”–”power out-
put” condition, chosen to be representative of a typical power requirement
that HVIET must daily sustain. Then, we will perturb the network, by re-
moving links, and we will detect if the ”damaged” network is still able to
produce a correct response to the input–output demand, within the imposed
physical constraints.
We have modeled the transport of the electrical flow in the network by
using a DC power flow model. The DC power flow equations [13] provide a
linear relationship between the active power flowing through the lines and
the power input into the nodes. They can be formulated as follows:
Fkm =
θk − θm
xkm
(7)
where xkm is the series reactance of the line connecting nodes k and m, Fkm
is the active power flow on this line and θk, θm are the voltage phase of the
k’th and m’th nodes. Summing on all branches connected to the node k, the
power flow of that node Pk is
Pk =
∑
m
Fkm = θk
∑
m
x−1km −
∑
m
θm
xkm
(8)
This can be written in the matrix form
P = Bθ (9)
where Bkm = −1/xkm (for k 6= m) and Bkk =
∑
l 1/xkl. For the calculation
of B, double lines were regarded as a single line and its reactance adjusted
accordingly. B is a N × N matrix. Its rank is, however, N − 1 since the
network must comply with the conservation condition
∑N
i=1 Pi = 0. To solve
the system, an equation is removed and the associated link is chosen in a
way to introduce a reference node whose phase angle is arbitrarily set to
θ = 0. For a given input vector P(0) and a given set of line’s reactance
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xkm, the linear system in eq. (9) can be solved and a solution is found in
terms of θij and Fij. Two constraints must be imposed to ensure the physical
correctness of the solution. These originate from the fact that the DC power
flow method results from the elimination of the imaginary part of the current
equations, under the hypothesis that power phase angles are small. It should
thus result, ∀(k,m), that
1. θkm < 30 degrees
2. | Fkm |< F
max
km (whereF
max
km is some specified limiting power flux which
can be sustained by the line between nodes k and m).
If constraint (1) is not fulfilled, the inductive part of the electrical flux cannot
be disregarded and eq.(9) does not hold. Constraint (2) is a technological
threshold, relating to the specific line’s impedance. A too large flux pro-
duces an unendurable heat which is normally prevented, in real transmission
networks, by ad hoc elements which disconnect the line.
Data needed to solve the DC power flow system are thus:
• (a) the vector of input-output demand P
(0)
i (i = 1, N). Data used
for the simulation represents a typical snapshot of the vector (injected
power–extracted power) experienced daily in the HVIET; they sum up
to a total power injected in the line of the order Ptot = 31.8GW which
represents an average power demand in a spring–time working day in
Italy- May 2005 data). Source nodes are characterized by negative Pi
values, junction by vanishing values, loads by positive values;
• (b) the line’s reactance xij ;
• (c) the values of the maximum sustainable power flux Fmaxij for each
line.
The solution of the DC power flow system allows to evaluate: (1) the
power flux Fij along the lines resulting from the given input vector P
(0); (2)
the phase angles θij . These results will constitute the ”normal” response of
the network to the input conditions P(0). Lines with the highest flux value
are reported in Table 4: second column contains the line’s initial and ending
nodes, third column contains the power flux value.
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4 Perturbations and dynamical vulnerability
Structural perturbations are imposed by removing an increasing number of
lines, and measuring the resulting distribution of the power flux as a function
of the perturbation strength ξ, defined as the number of simultaneously–
removed lines. Disregarding the lines whose removal produces the discon-
nection of one (or more) node (in these cases, treated in [4], the DC power
flow equations cannot be solved), the more vulnerable parts of the networks
will be those lines whose removal will perturb the network at the point that
it will not be able anymore to fulfill the dispatching of the required power
vector P(0) (i.e. within the imposed constraints (1) and (2) above).
Starting from the input vector P(0), we have carried out two types of
simulations.
In the first type, we removed an increasing number of lines: if the power
flux established in the perturbed network is not consistent with the required
constraints, the system is defined as unsatisfied and its level of Operability
(defined through a Quality of Service (QoS) function) is set to zero. For
a given perturbation strength, there will be cases in which the removal of
specific lines produces a vanishing QoS, others in which, in turn, it produces
a power flow redistribution still fulfilling the imposed contraints (in such a
case, QoS = 1). In the cases where a part of the network (one single node or
an entire subnetwork) is disconnected, the DC power flux equations cannot
be solved and the dispatching problem cannot be fulfilled; also in this case
QoS = 0. The value of the QoS associated to a given perturbation strength
will result by the average over the different values of the QoS issued upon
the different choices of lines removal (< QoS > in fig.2 left). We have firstly
separately removed each line (ξ = 1). Then, we have removed all pairs
(ξ = 2), triplets (ξ = 3) and quadruplets (ξ = 4) of lines. As, in the cases
ξ > 2 an exaustive evaluation of all possible line’s combinations cannot be
attempted, we have evaluated the average over a large number of different
cases (of the order of 104) for ξ = 3 and ξ = 4.
In the second type of simulations, we repeat the same as in the first type
with the difference that, when the perturbation is such to inhibit the system’s
satisfaction, we implement an optimization strategy determining the optimal
variation of the input vector P able to re–establish a correct power flow (i.e.
within the imposed constraint). We called this procedure ”re–dispatching”.
The ”optimal” value is thus searched by reducing the input power (and the
corresponding output power) in a way to maximize the function QoS
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QoS = 1−
∑
i∈loads[P
(0)
i − Pi]∑
i∈loads P
(0)
i
(10)
where the value of Pi is the input vector resulting by optimization. Re–
dispatching allows the fulfilment of the electrical problem, although with
some degradation, measured by the resulting value of the QoS.
The general procedure of the re–dispatching is the following. If we define
as S˜ and L˜ the set of all sources and loads, respectively, and N˜L as the
number of loads in the L˜ list, it must:
1. give all nodes zero value (Pi = 0 ∀ i)
2. choose a source node i ∈ S˜.
3. increase Pi such that Pi = Pi + ǫ
4. increase value of all loads (still below required consumption) such that
∀j ∈ L˜ Pj = Pj− ǫ/N˜L (loads are measured in negative power units).
5. solve DC flow equations and, if constraints (1) and (2) are fulfilled,
accept the changes and choose a different source node (i = i+1). else,
if constraints are not kept, change again the values of loads and sources
to what it was before step 3.
6. go to step 2
If, at step 5, changes are accepted, sources and loads which have reached
the required value (defined in the formulation of the problem by P(0)) are
taken out of the list. The procedure will continue until both sets are empty
or until no more changes can be made. Fig.2 contains also the results of the
behavior of < QoS > in the re-dispatching case, for ξ = 1−4. It is clear that,
in absence of re-dispatching actions, as soon as ξ > 1, the < QoS > value
starts decreasing. The electrical network is, in fact, designed to run properly,
in practically all load conditions, for ξ = 1, unless the cases in which nodes
are disconnected with a single line removal (this happens to nodes with k = 1,
called leaves). If one operates the (hypothetical) re-dispatching procedure
which has been proposed in the simulations, the system can be brought to
resist to severe perturbations with a resulting quite small degradation. It has
to be considered, however, that the type of re-dispatching prefigured in the
present work cannot be easily produced in a limited amount of time and, in
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some cases, it also requires a huge technical effort. Simulations results have
been produced to show how a rapid and wise action on the power sources and
loads could significantly reduce the impact of severe faults on the network
(see, e.g., the resulting value of the < QoS > upon re-dispatching for ξ = 4).
The results of the re–dispatching strategy can be also used to establish
a hierarchy of lines, on the basis of the power reduction associated to their
removal. In other words, when ξ = 1, each line is removed and the corre-
sponding re–dispatching procedure is performed if the removal of that line
produces the system’s inoperability. If one relates the specific line with the
associated value of ∆P =
∑
i∈loads[Pi(L0) − Pi] one obtains the graph re-
ported in fig.3. The indication of the electrical lines whose removal requires
the highest amount of redispatched power to restore electrical flux is also re-
ported in Table 5. Data show that there are links whose removal introduces
a severe perturbation: although the network is still able to sustain a power
flow, its global amount should be significantly reduced. There are a few lines
whose removal reduces the overall network’s capacity of an amount around
1500 MW.
The obtained results show that only a small number of nodes having a
”functional” relevance for the network can be discovered through the topol-
ogy analysis of its graph. The inspection of Tables 4 and 5 shows that critical
lines for electrical transport are related to nodes 214, 184, 117, 190, 127, 130
etc.; this apparently does not appear in the first ranks of nodes (and lines)
with high topological relevance.
A more detailed quantitative assessment of this point can be obtained by
plotting, for each line of the network, the relative value of the information
centrality Iij and that of the associated ∆P (fig.4). This figure compares
a topological relevant quantity (the line information centrality), related to
the ”structural” damage produced by the removal of a line, with a functional
relevant quantity (the value of ∆P ). It comes clear that, disregarding the
lines whose removal produces an irreparable damage (i.e. one or more nodes
are disconnected and DC power flow equations cannot be solved anymore; in
that case the value of ∆P is arbitrarily set to ∞), high values of ∆P are not
necessarily associated to large values of Iij . This observation validates the
assumption that ”structural” and ”functional” vulnerability are associated
with different sets of nodes and lines.
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5 Conclusions
This work has shown how it is possible to set up a functional model of an
electrical network enabling to relate the network’s topology to its level of
function. A simple DC power flow method has been used to evaluate the
”efficiency” of the network to sustain the flux of a given amount of electrical
power, deduced by real data relative to the italian dispatching of high–voltage
electrical power (380 kV). Topological analysis of the network has put in evi-
dence a number of lines which are related to the network’s structural vulner-
ability. These lines have been associated either to links with high centrality
properties, either to links belonging to the first critical section resulting from
the spectral analysis of the Laplacian matrix associated to the network’s
graph. The DC power flow simulation has allowed to establish a hierarchy
of network’s lines to which is associated a high functional vulnerability (the
removal of these lines can be counterbalanced only by considerably reducing
the power flow level that the network can sustain). Comparing the two sets
of data (lines of high structural vulnerability and lines of high functional
vulnerability) we have put in evidence that the electrical flow simulations
qualify as relevant lines which are not those identified as lines of maximal
structural relevance. For this reason, it should be remarked that topological
analysis and the simulation of ”functional” models (such as the DC power
flow model, for the case of electrical networks) provide complementary infor-
mations; both their results must be used to correctly predict the vulnerability
properties of complex networks.
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Table 1: Rank of nodes on the basis of their degree k (second column);
betweenneess centrality bi (third column) and information centrality Ii
(fourth column).
rank highest k (k) highest bi highest Ii
1 178(11) 183 201
2 158(11) 168 183
3 201(10) 153 158
4 211(8) 207 214
5 200(8) 184 103
6 124(8) 154 152
Table 2: Rank of links on the basis of their betweenneess centrality bij
(second column) and information centrality Iij (third column). Links are
displayed by the initial and ending node’s numbers.
rank highest bij highest Iij
1 153–168 183-207
2 153–183 153-183
3 183–207 100-191
4 170–204 183-233
5 109–158 178-263
6 161–183 192-226
Table 3: List of links belonging to the first critical section (see text).
137-154 145-143 145-169 153-183 191-169 212-154
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Table 4: Rank of lines on the basis of the flux they sustain in normal (i.e.
under the P (0) power vector) operating conditions.
rank line flux (MW)
1 214–184 1324
2 117–190 1295
3 117–201 1270
4 120–190 1087
5 127–103 992
Table 5: Rank of lines on the basis of the power flux that should be extracted
by the network (∆P ) to restore a correct networks functioning when that line
is removed. Line in second column, power flux to be extracted by the network
(in MW) in third column.
rank line ∆P (MW)
1 214-184 1532.4
2 127-103 1475.4
3 127-186 954.0
4 117-190 916.3
5 117-165 729.3
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Figure 1: Italian high-voltage (380 kV) transmission network (HVIET) re-
sulting from the available data. Figure shows the first critical section (bold
lines) resulting from the application of the min-cut theorem (see text). Nodes
belonging to the two resulting subnetworks are highlighted in white and red.
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Figure 2: Value of the QoS as a function of the perturbation ξ. Squares
represent QoS values when no optimization is performed, circles when re–
dispatcing is performed.
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Figure 3: Value of the quantity ∆P as a function of line’s number. Lines
whose removal produce the need of a larger re–dispatching are indicated.
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Figure 4: Scatter plot relating information centrality (x axis) and the value
of ∆P (in MW), on the y-axis, of all the network’s lines. Lines whose removal
produces the disconnection of one (or more) nodes are not displayed in the
figure as the ∆P value which is arbitrarily associated to them is set to ∞.
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